Battle of Neufchateau

Phil's game started on 13/07/12. French v Germans in the early days of WWI.

More Photos <Here>

Week One: 13th Jul 2012 - French (Mike W & Steve) versus Germans (Mike N & Rupert).

Week Two: 27th July

French Situation Briefing
The French Fourth army has just begun its advance into the Belgium Ardennes. Intelligence from the Belgium’s and the French cavalry of Sordet’s Cavalry Corp is that the Germans right wing has passed north of the Ardennes, and that only weak German forces are guarding the German hinge between their northern and southern army groups. The Objective of the French Fourth army is to smash the hinge and cut off the German northern army group.

The 5th Colonial Brigade, an independent brigade in the Elite Colonial Corps is marching independently on the left of the Colonial Corp with the 3rd Colonial Division to its right. The 12th Corp is to its left. The day’s march began with the crossing of the Semois River at 06.00, with the objective of reaching Neufchâteau by 10.30 hours for the days march.

French Artillery, from Phil hardy's collection

Within 1km of the Brigades start point, the lead troops in the advance guard are fired on by a German cavalry patrol. These promptly retire, but repeat this procedure several times at successive tree lines. The advance becomes very cautious with company strength infantry patrols sent out to check and clear tree lines and buildings. On approaching the bridge southwest of Neufchâteau at 11.40 hours, fire is received from a couple of buildings near the bridge, and a German cavalry patrol is seen to promptly leave. On crossing the bridge, the sound of wagons moving on cobblestones can be heard from the other side of the ridge to the north. The commander of the lead advance guard battalion sends an infantry patrol into Neufchâteau which receives heavy fire and an infantry patrol up onto the ridge, which spots artillery disappearing into the woods to the west, and a small group of resting German cavalry.

At 12.15 the Brigade commander receives a report that the advance guard is engaged by a superior enemy force. The lead battalion is outside Neufchâteau, the second battalion is resting at Grapfontaine.

French Doctrine and order of March 1914

Advance Guard

Divisional Cavalry squadron

1st Infantry Regiment (3 battalions)

Divisional Engineer Company 

Artillery Group (3 batteries, from the Divisional artillery regiment)

Divisional HQ + Artillery regiment HQ

Main body

1st Infantry Brigade HQ

French Infantry Advance

2nd Infantry Regiment

Divisional Artillery Regiment (2 groups each of 3 batteries)

2nd Infantry Brigade (2 Infantry Regiments & HQs)

There would be a gap of 2km between the rear of the advance guard, and the head of the main-body. The advance guard would march out approximately 1 ¼ hours ahead of the main body.

Doctrine

French doctrine required the advance guard to fight for information. On contacting the enemy it was to attack immediately, with the aim of forcing the enemy to fire and reveal his positions, strength and disrupt his deployment. If the enemy was weak the advance guard was to force him to retire, and continue the advance. The aim was to minimise the chances of a premature deployment of the main body and to keep up a rapid pace of advance.

Once the enemy’s main position had been identified the Divisional commander would deploy the massed Divisional Artillery regiment to dominate the key ground, and support the major infantry attack. In French doctrine, the artillery provided the fire and the Infantry the manoeuvre. Flanking manoeuvres of the enemy position were co-ordinated at the Corp or Army level, using the other Division in the Corp, or those of a neighbouring Corp. Within the Division the aim of the attack was to pierce the enemy’s position or force him to retire. As a Division would not be manoeuvring to its flanks, flanks were to be secured by detaching Infantry battalions to hold key terrain to the flanks, usually high ground.

French doctrine had recognized that it was the initial volley of artillery shells that did the most damage to the enemy (i.e. before he had taken cover), that artillery fire was naturally inaccurate and that a prolonged preparatory fire against an enemy in cover caused few casualties, and used a lot of ammunition. To maximise the effect of their artillery the French artillery would only fire once the Infantry had begun their attack, and the enemy had revealed himself by firing. The first target was the enemy’s artillery. Once that had been driven off the enemy’s infantry was engaged.

The theory was that massed French 75’s would be rapidly deployed forward to short range in the open to maximise accuracy and speed into action. Short bursts of intense fire were to be used to kill the enemy if he revealed himself by firing, or otherwise to neutralise him by forcing him to keep his head down, thus using ammunition efficiently. The principle was to seize and maintain the initiative by rapid concentrations of fire and men. The French 75mm field gun ‘system’ was expressly design to this doctrine.

Concealed or defiladed positions were only used if there was time and they were in convenient positions.

The artillery acquired targets either by sending an officer to liaise with an Infantry HQ it had been subordinated to by the Divisional commander. Or more usually the Battery commander would observe from the battery position or forward of it if the battery was deployed in a defiladed position behind a crest line. The Divisional commander would specify a part of the front the battery or group of batteries was to engage the enemy across. Targets would be engaged either as opportunity presented, or as designated by the Divisional commander based on information received from subordinates. Apart from the group of field gun batteries with the advance guard, all the other artillery remained under the Divisional commander at all times.

Corp level artillery was an artillery reserve used to reinforce the Divisional level artillery, and when done so came under the Divisional commanders control.

The town is contested.

Telephone communication was only used between the batteries of a group if there was time to deploy it. Sometimes it would be used to connect a battery commander forward of a crest line to his battery defiladed behind the crest. Main reliance was on observation from the battery position and runners.

In defense French doctrine proscribed a main defensive line, large reserves for counter-attacking, and strongly held forward positions, the purpose of which was to deceive the enemy as to the position of the main defensive line. The aim was to force the enemy into deploying his infantry into combat formations too early, waste time, reveal his plan of attack, and make his infantry vulnerable to French artillery fire. Enemy preparatory artillery fire would also be wasted on empty ground in front of the main position. The French would keep a large part of their artillery in reserve to be deployed as the main enemy attack developed seeking to smother it in massed artillery fire.

Machineguns were used to provided direct fire support for the infantry; they were deployed in over-watch or flanking positions.

Corp and Army level cavalry provided the main reconnaissance troops; Divisional cavalry squadrons provided only local security. 

Germans move in to the woods

German Situation Briefing
The German 4th Army began its march through the Belgium Ardennes 3 days ago. Its role is to guard the German 3rd Army flank. It is currently marching west, its component Korps echeloned back from north to south.

At 03.00 the 4th Army commander, Duke Albrecht of Wurttemberg has ordered 18th Reserve Korps (21st and 25th Reserve Divisions) to assemble at Neufchâteau and to prepare to march south.

At 10.00 hours the 21st Reserve Division HQ received a report from a cavalry patrol that a very strong French force was northwest of St Medard (west south west of Neufchâteau) heading north. To prevent the 21st Division from being outflanked the decision was taken  to march the 21st division west to Petitvior which is north of St Medard and 2.5km west of Neufchâteau.

At 11.00 hours 18th Korp HQ sent a cavalry patrol to Straimont (in the direction of St Medard) to determine if it was occupied by the French. On its return at 11.40 hours, it made contact with French forces at the Neufchâteau Bridge. The patrol duly reported this to a now very surprised 21st Reserve Division HQ by 12.00 hours!  Another French force had gained a position on the Divisions left on dominating ground that had split the Division’s march column in two!

21st Reserve Division troops were positioned as follows. The lead regiment at Petitvior was attacking the French. The rest of the lead Brigade was in march column in the Forêt de Blancs Cailloux to the west of Neufchâteau, along with most of Divisional Artillery Regiment. Two batteries of the artillery regiment were still to the east of the forest. The lead regiment (87th RIR) of the rear brigade was in Neufchâteau, and the other regiment (8oth RIR) on the road north of Neufchâteau.

Orders are urgently required!

Elements of the 25th Reserve division are to the east of Neufchâteau;
25th RFAR at Offaing,
83rd RIR at Hamipre,
163rd RI between Offaing and Hamipre.

Germane Doctrine and order of March 1914
Advance Guard
Divisional Cavalry squadron
1st Infantry Regiment (3 battalions)
1st battalion
MG Company
2nd Battalion
3rd Battalion
Divisional Engineer Company
Artillery Abteilung (3 batteries, from the Divisional artillery Brigade)

Main body
1st Infantry Brigade HQ
2nd Infantry Regiment
Divisional HQ
Divisional Artillery Brigade (3 Abteilung each of 3 batteries)
2nd Infantry Brigade (2 Infantry Regiments & HQs)

Notes
A Reserve Division had only one artillery regiment of 2 Abteilung each of three batteries. This was kept together as the Divisional artillery in the order of march.

Sometimes in an Active Army Corp an artillery abteilung was also attached to the second Infantry Brigade.

German Divisions had three squadrons of cavalry, the other two would be providing local reconnaissance and security.

There would be a gap of 1km between the rear of the advance guard, and the head of the main-body. The advance guard would march out approximately ½ hour ahead of the main body.

Doctrine
German doctrine on meeting an enemy position that the cavalry screen could not force to retire, or penetrate to acquire more information, was for the advance guard to deploy defensively and begin a fire fight to gain fire superiority. The rear battalions of the advance guard would deploy to the flanks, often one was kept in reserve. The attached abteilung of guns would deploy in a concealed position as standard practice, with their forward observation officer establishing a fixed observation post connected by telephone to his abteilungs position. The observation post would be position so that he could see the both the enemy and friendly infantry positions. The machine gun company was kept as a massed fire reserve by the regimental commander to be deployed forward into the firing line at the decisive point in the fire fight.

Usual deployment practice was keep one battalion in each Infantry Regiment in reserve and a further battalion from either Infantry Regiment in a Brigade reserve. They were fed into the fire fight as required.

 As fire superiority was gained and the enemy weakened, the regimental firing line would advance in stages to a point where they could assault the enemy position. This was purposely a line to avoid any part becoming isolated and suffering from concentrated enemy fire. The whole action of a fire fight from initial deployment to final assault was expected to take 3-4 hours and upto 20% casualties.

As other infantry formations in the Division came up they were deployed to the flanks with the express purpose to turn the enemy’s flanks and either to surround him or force him to retire.

The divisional artillery would initially be used to silence or drive off the enemy’s artillery. It would then support the fire fight/s at the decisive points, though the infantry were expected to be able to gain fire superiority and advance without artillery support. If a Corp heavy field howitzer regiment (150mm) was available its primary mission was counterbattery fire, engaging individual enemy batteries one at a time by the whole regiment.

If direct fire by field guns was required, one or two guns would be detached from a battery and pushed forward to support the infantry. It was not usual for batteries to operate independently.

Pursuit was carried out by fire from the artillery and infantry, while divisional cavalry would harry the enemy’s rearguards. The army level Cavalry Divisions would attempt to head the enemy off by fast parallel flank marches. Once the attacking troops had rallied and the battlefield secured a new advance guard was formed, usually from reserves not involved in the battle.

Reconnaissance and security was carried out at Divisional and Army level

Defensive positions consisted of a single strongly held line on high ground. Artillery would be concealed behind a crest, with observers forward. Strong reserves would be held ready nearby in concealed positions to counterattack.